




Th e process of stronger connecting of countries belonging to the Old Continent in the form of the European Union is moving 
towards the East, which made Serbia start its negotiation process for a full EU membership. Th e Croatian view on this process 
is specifi c and largely based on negative past experience of living together in one country, which ended up in the Homeland 
War (internationally called Yugoslav war), whose memories are still fresh. Th erefore, this process is of great importance for 
the Croatian politics. Serbian political elites and media advocate for fast accession to the EU, whereas a signifi cant number of 
Croatian politicians show not only caution and distrust, but to some extent even the fear of this integration. To become a full 
member state, Serbia must undoubtedly fulfi l strong accession criteria. From the beginning of the negotiation process, Croatia 
started with a rather harsh political rhetoric of setting diff erent conditions and using its recently established right of being an 
EU member state to force Serbia to compromises in solving still open legal disputes. 
Th e main goal of this paper is to demonstrate by using adequate methods and modern metrics how diff erences in statements 
given by various diplomatic-political circles in comparison to specifi c media announcements may with their varieties and 
various interpretations generate instability in both countries.
Th e purpose of this paper is the research and analysis of diplomatic statements and media announcements on this matter in 
order to gain a better understanding of bilateral relations between two countries and of perception by its citizens - Croatia as 
the full member state and Serbia as the candidate country.
Results of this research imply the presence of a confl ict situation in the negotiation process and a negative turn in geopolitical 
perception which is of a decreasing probability to solve open issues in bilateral negotiation. Th e Governments of both countries 
must raise their eff orts in communication to reach valid decisions based on more rational assessment and subsequently inform 
their public on the discussions in an adequate and correct manner.   
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relations.
Adress for correspondence: Željko Sičaja, Republic of Croatia Ministry of the Interior, Ulica grada Vukovara 33, 10000 Za-
greb, Croatia, e-mail: zeljko.sicaja@gmail.com.
DIFFERENCES IN DIPLOMATIC AND MEDIA RHETORIC 
REGARDING CROATIA’S CONDITIONS FOR SERBIAN EU 
ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS
Željko Sičaja1, Natalija Parlov2
1Republic of Croatia Ministry of the Interior, Zagreb, Croatia
2Parlov Ltd Digital Intelligence, Zagreb, Croatia
1.  INTRODUCTION
Th e aim of this paper is to explain the diff e-
rence between the diplomatic and media rhetoric 
communicated by diplomatic-political circles of 
Croatia and Serbia and how its diff erent interpreta-
tions based on who owns the media can contribute 
to a deterioration of mutual relations on a bilateral 
level.
In the context of the political relations of Cro-
atia and Serbia on a bilateral level, through an 
analysis of the media space and offi  cial statements 
made by institutions from both countries, the aut-
hors strived to determine the causes of bad poli-
tical communication and mutual accusations of 
political elites for “obstructing” and “abusing” the 
process of Serbian EU accession negotiations. In 
this analysis we have specifi ed a clear distinction 
between diplomatic and media rhetoric.
Under diplomatic rhetoric we mean all offi  cial 
announcements from state institutions and EU in-
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stitutions responsible for conducting foreign policy 
and accession negotiations.
Media rhetoric entails diff erent interpretations 
of the offi  cial announcements from state instituti-
ons made by the media, statements and reactions 
from political actors in both states and statements 
by representatives of the European Commission. 
Depending on whose media space a certain infor-
mation or reaction was published in and its tona-
lity, we categorised the articles according to a scale 
of favourability: positively, negatively and neutrally.
Hypotheses:
H1: Negative rhetoric of diplomatic-political 
circles aff ects the bilateral relations between 
the two states
H2: Double standards in interpreting historical 
events and emphasizing topics from the past 
aff ect bilateral relations
Th e methodologies used in this paper are 
content analysis, discourse analysis, comparative 
analysis and macrostructural analysis of publica-
tions.
2.  HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND 
POLITICAL RHETORIC BETWEEN THE 
ACTORS
Th e process of expansion of the European Uni-
on is not and cannot be fi nished until all countri-
es from south-eastern Europe are admitted to full 
membership. Th e great enthusiasm present among 
the EU political elite aft er the fi rst enlargement to 
the countries from the former Eastern Bloc in 2004 
slowly waned on the one side due to the slowness 
and ineffi  ciency of the European administration, 
and on the other side because of the inconsistency 
of the political elites in the candidate countries. 
Since that biggest enlargement, only three more 
countries became full EU member states, Bulgaria 
and Romania in 2007, and Croatia in 2013. In this 
moment Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedo-
nia and Turkey have the status of a confi rmed EU 
membership candidate. Some of them have opened 
the negotiation process, while others still have to 
satisfy additional requirements.
Serbia fi led its application for membership in 
the EU in December 2009, and it gained the status 
of a candidate in March 2012. Th e accession nego-
tiations were opened by a European Council Deci-
sion in June 2013 [1]. So far in the negotiation pro-
cess fi ve Intergovernmental Conferences have been 
held, eight negotiation chapters have been opened 
and one chapter has been temporarily closed [2].
Resolving open issues and developing good 
neighbourly relations are a prerequisite for mem-
bership because the European Union does not 
want to get in a position where unresolved bilateral 
issues between two member states can aff ect the 
decision-making process and cause potential con-
fl icts [3].
Th e eff ects of polarisation and disagreement 
in certain topics can be explained by representing 
convincing arguments which presuppose that pe-
ople will probably be exposed to them and which 
speak in favour of their starting position [4].
It is no secret that relations between Croatia 
and Serbia are strained and burdened with the 
past and that the level of political communication 
is very low. Political rhetoric is actually an “instru-
ment of political communication” [5]. Th e harsh 
diplomatic-political rhetoric currently present 
between Zagreb and Belgrade is a direct consequ-
ence of communicating through offi  cial announ-
cements and of media outings of certain political 
actors on both sides. Furthermore, the disputes 
which arose during the defi ning of negotiation 
positions for opening Chapter 23, concerning ju-
dicial reform, and Chapter 26, concerning culture 
and education, also have their roots in the past. 
Problems regarding universal jurisdiction over war 
crimes committed on the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia, representation of the Croatian national 
minority in Serbian institutions, as well as educa-
tion in the Croatian language in accordance with 
the Croatian national curriculum are issues which 
from the Croatian viewpoint are not only of a bila-
teral character, while the Serbian side holds that it 
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is possible to resolve them on a bilateral level and 
that they should not be a burden for Serbia in its 
accession negotiations with the EU [6]. 
Croatia made the opening of Chapter 23 condi-
tional upon a guarantee that Serbia will not abuse 
its law on universal jurisdiction for war crimes tri-
als on the former Yugoslavian territory and upon 
strengthening the rights of the Croatian national 
minority in Serbia, as well as full cooperation with 
the Hague war crimes tribunal. Aft er the formula-
tion highlighting “the need for regional cooperation 
and good neighbourly relations in processing war 
crimes, including the goal of avoiding a confl ict of 
jurisdictions” entered the EU’s common negotiation 
positions, in June 2016 Croatia gave its consent for 
opening Chapter 23 [7].
Issues regarding the rights of the Croatian na-
tional minority for education in the Croatian lan-
guage in accordance with the Croatian national 
curriculum which are part of the negotiation po-
sitions for Chapter 26 were resolved by Serbia by 
signing an agreement annex in Belgrade between 
the Serbian Minister of Education, representative 
of the Croatian national minority and the Institute 
of Textbooks of Serbia. Th e Croatian Ministry of 
Foreign and European Aff airs confi rmed in its re-
lease from December 2016 that it had no further 
reservations regarding these issues and that it will 
have no objections regarding the Chapter during 
the defi ning of negotiation positions.  
Aft er the disagreements around the accession 
negotiations were temporarily resolved, the Serbi-
an media space was full of diff erent interpretations 
and statements made by the political elite about 
pro-Ustasha sentiment again fl ourishing in Croa-
tia which continually emphasized the endangering 
of the rights of the Serbian minority, rehabilitation 
of Cardinal Stepinac, problems with the Cyrillic 
alphabet in Vukovar, the “Serbian chocolate” case, 
etc. On the other side, apart from certain right-
wing media, the Croatian media space tries to 
communicate  with the public in a more moderate 
and calmer way regarding the Croatia-Serbia rela-
tions, even though a harsher reaction from senior 
government offi  cials is also not uncommon.
Attitudes can change in diff erent ways. As re-
search of cognitive dissonance theory has shown, 
attitudes change when people behave contrary 
to their own attitude for a small external award. 
When this happens, people fi nd a justifi cation for 
their behaviour, aligning their attitudes with their 
behaviour [8].
According to a statement made by the Serbi-
an Minister of Foreign Aff airs Ivica Dačić, Serbia 
expects from the Croatian government a clearer 
and more resolute attitude against the relativisa-
tion and rehabilitation of crimes against Serbs in 
World War II, as well as in the confl ict during the 
1990’s aft er the dissolution of the former SFRY. He 
emphasizes that the past can not be changed, but 
what can be infl uenced is that the present and the 
future be better for the people and the countries 
[9]. Th is statement also off ers a general image of 
the media and diplomatic-political rhetoric of the 
Serbian side towards Croatia.
Croatian diplomatic-political circles and the 
vast majority of media represent the general atti-
tude that Serbia should not be given way in the ne-
gotiations and that Serbia must defi nitely fulfi l the 
negotiation criteria from all Chapters in order to 
become a member of the European Union. Apart 
from that, issues relating to bilateral relations with 
Serbia might be the only topic regarding which the-
re is a consensus among the ruling party, the oppo-
sition and the media in Croatia.
Th ere is no progress in the relations between 
Croatia and Serbia and all the more oft en certain 
mini-crises arise among other reasons because of 
an oft en reaching for historical topics, especially 
during election campaigns [10]. Opinions about 
the interpretation of these topics are deeply divided 
and will not be brought closer together until both 
sides start to consider all victims as equal and until 
they stop having double standards in interpreting 
historical events. Each side highlights its own vic-
tims, and when the question of guilt among their 
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own rows arises, they try to relativize it. Topics that 
were current during the confl icts at the beginning 
of the 1990’s are still dominant and they are always 
emphasized whenever the need for gaining politi-
cal points arises.
As far as the accession negotiations are con-
cerned, the enlargement policy has always been 
an opportunity and a legitimate means for all EU 
member states to set conditions for the negotiation 
progress of candidate countries and to resolve open 
bilateral issues with them in that way. For that rea-
son Croatia is very sensitive when it is being called 
out for making such issues conditional in the acce-
ssion negotiations with Serbia, since Croatia had 
similar experiences with Italy and Slovenia. Croatia 
is not breaking EU’s rules in this situation, and if it 
wants to become a member of the European Uni-
on, Serbia must realise that some bilateral issues 
will be opened up in the access negotiations, be it 
from Croatia’s side or some other member state.
Th e European Union must also act because the 
“mere expressing and reshaping of ideas can only 
increase a move towards a more extreme viewpo-
int” [11].
Th e relations between Croatia and Serbia will 
not change for the better even in the future becau-
se their open issues are not classical bilateral issues 
and the help of a third party might be necessary for 
their resolution.
3.  DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
DIPLOMATIC AND MEDIA RHETORIC
Th e establishment of diplomatic relations is 
considered the fi rst step in offi  cial relations betwe-
en two states. According to Article 2 of the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, these relati-
ons are established based on mutual consent of the 
related states [12].
Th e signing of the Agreement on Normalisation 
of Relations Between the Republic of Croatia and 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on August 23rd 
1996 opened the path for establishing diplomatic 
relations between the two states which shortly be-
fore that were still at war. In an offi  cial exchange of 
diplomatic notes on establishing diplomatic relati-
ons on September 9th 1996, the Republic of Croatia 
and FR Yugoslavia accepted the obligations arising 
from the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relati-
ons and the norms of international law.  
Since then these relations have been at diff erent 
levels, among other things because of fresh memo-
ries from the war period. According to Berković, 
there is no exact breakdown and defi nition of re-
lations between states, but international practice 
has crystallised certain titles for specifi c types of 
these relations, which imply a certain type of relati-
onship towards their nature and structure, ranging 
from the most friendly to tense. Th erefore, accor-
ding to international practice, relations between 
states are divided into the following: allied, good-
neighbourly, cordial, friendly, good, fair, indiff e-
rent, cold, tense, de facto relations, suspended and 
terminated [13].
Th e way of diplomatic communication also de-
pends upon the state of relations between two co-
untries. Th e usual procedure is that the state, i.e. its 
ministry of foreign aff airs, refers its messages and 
corresponds through its diplomatic representation 
in the other country [13]. Both the president and 
the prime minister of the country communicate in 
this way. Nevertheless, we can grasp the complete 
picture of the relations between two states from the 
diplomatic and media rhetoric in both states.
By diplomatic rhetoric we mean all offi  cial 
announcements from state institutions and institu-
tions of the European Union responsible for con-
ducting foreign aff airs and accession negotiations.
Media rhetoric entails diff erent interpretations 
of the offi  cial announcements from state instituti-
ons made by the media, the statements and reacti-
ons of political actors in both states and statements 
made by representatives of the European Commi-
ssion.
By analysing both segments we reached the 
conclusion that both diplomatic and media rhe-
toric are closely connected because by listening to 
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public opinion the political elites in their public sta-
tements for the media, as well as institutions in the-
ir communication with the public, form messages 
they want to present to the public.
Values are closely related to beliefs, but they 
also contain components of the ideal. While beliefs 
refl ect that which we think is true, values refl ect 
that which we would like to become true, even if it 
is not true currently [14].
According to [15], the development of mass 
communication has enabled news to spread qu-
ickly, but a newspaper comment or analysis of a 
certain event in the relations between two states 
can not replace a structured diplomatic report 
composed by a good diplomat working in the fi eld. 
Apart from that, newspaper reports and analyses 
oft en reinterpret statements made by offi  cials of a 
certain state in a sensationalist manner and draw 
things out of context, so that the public gets the im-
pression that two states have a problem. Sometimes 
this may be correct, but sometimes it is nowhere 
near the truth.
Cottam [14] assume that people process po-
litical information received through diff erent in-
formation channels in the following order: the in-
formation is received and a certain node or brain 
scheme is adjusted, then it is compared with the 
knowledge structure and appropriate existing no-
des and saved in the memory.  Finally, when an 
individual has to make a decision about political 
action, this evaluation of an attitude actually comes 
from the individual’s memory.
Media rhetoric in certain states also serves po-
litical actors for the construction of political ima-
ge. Be it through the election process or making a 
decision which can cause certain reactions in the 
public, politicians and offi  cials are very careful how 
and in what way they will communicate with the 
media. Th e bond between politicians and media is 
unbreakable because communication on that level 
fl ows every day in both directions. Th e publishing 
of a president or prime minister’s offi  cial positions, 
as well as those of leaders of certain state instituti-
ons, is usually formed into offi  cial announcements, 
but these same leaders are oft en called upon to 
comment on direct journalists’ questions even 
outside of offi  cial press conferences.
According to the Yale approach to changing a 
position, the persuasiveness of a message is depen-
dant on aspects of the sources of a message, aspects 
of the message itself, i.e. its content, and aspects of 
the audience [8]. Th is segment illustrates how im-
portant such public appearances are, because if a 
politician is eloquent, informed and has controlled 
communication towards the wider public, his or 
her messages and positions will surely be heard.
Although it was originally thought that the 
increase in the off er of information will increase 
the informedness of the target public, the actual 
result is completely opposite, since the quantity of 
placed information is too big for the recipient to be 
able to process it [16].
Media rhetoric in Croatia and Serbia functi-
ons in a similar way, only in this case the messages 
trying to be presented in the public in both coun-
tries are burdened with open issues in bilateral re-
lations. Politicians’ reactions to diff erent events are 
on both sides interpreted in support of petty daily 
political needs because neither side wants to leave 
an impression of leniency in its public, regardless of 
the fact that reducing tensions in statements given 
by offi  cial representatives of both states would per-
haps create prerequisites for bringing closer their 
positions in open issues and possibly an improve-
ment of relations.
In this case we can correlate with group dis-
cussions in social psychology where they lead to 
certain group members focusing on the group, in 
this case the media, and instead of perceiving the 
average public opinion, they oft en perceive that the 
public opinion is much more extreme than the one 
presented in the media [17,18].
In the past year we have witnessed a real war 
with offi  cial communication and exchange of pro-
test notes, and the media followed it in a quite bia-
sed manner. 
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A protest note is a note, regardless of what form 
of note it is, which is used to express a protest, com-
plaint or dissatisfaction regarding a position, issue 
or violation of a certain right, for which, according 
to the sender’s opinion, the recipient of the note is 
responsible. In so doing it does not have to be expli-
citly stated that the note in question is a protest 
note, but this can be discerned from its meaning 
and the goal of its content [13]. 
Th e root of these problems lies in the unresol-
ved problems from the past, and they culminated 
when Serbia accused Croatia that it is blocking the 
opening of certain chapters in the accession nego-
tiations as a member of the European Union be-
cause it feels that bilateral issues should be resolved 
outside this frame.
If we wanted to categorise the degree of current 
relations between Croatia and Serbia according 
to international practice, then we would certainly 
describe them as fair, since, as Svjetlan Berković 
writes in his book Diplomacy and the diplomatic 
profession, “fair (normal) relations are diplomatic 
relations between states based on respecting in-
ternational law and customs, as well as the usual 
courteous practice in the international community, 
with the subjects’ readiness to resolve their disputes 
peacefully” [13].
 Th e problems in the relations between Croatia 
and Serbia could be resolved quickly with a bit of 
political will to clearly defi ne the initial meeting at 
the top and set its clear agenda. Th is would entail 
that each state prepares memoranda in which they 
defi ne the open issues and problems they feel are 
unresolved and which would be agreed upon befo-
re a meeting at the level of Prime Minister. 
A memorandum is a type of diplomatic letter 
containing an overview of certain facts, opinions 
or requests, in which a certain position which is 
important, but oft en contentious, in interstate re-
lations is succintly but thoroughly presented and 
proven [13].
Aft er the exchange of the memoranda it would 
be most desirable to present the positions and reque-
sts of the opposite side to the domestic public and 
start a public debate. Th e results of the public debate 
would be a guidepost for the political elites on how 
to realise their interests, resolve the open issues and 
improve the relations between the two states.
According to [19], the maximum effi  ciency of a 
state in realising the goals of its foreign policy requ-
ires feedback from the total fl ow of information 
which actually represents the theory of cybernetics 
in the full sense of the word.
Th e diff erent diplomatic and media rhetoric 
in both media spaces contributes signifi cantly to 
public views in both states. Th ese views are based 
on a diff erent perception of open issues, where the 
public is constantly presented with the idea that the 
disagreements are connected to historical events 
and that history is repeating itself. However, even 
though neither state shows signs that the offi  cial 
policy is heading towards a new war confl ict, to-
pics burdened with the past and daily patronising 
from both sides through the media earns the actors 
political points on the domestic political scene, so 
an improvement of relations and resolving of open 
issues should not be expected any time soon.
Th is confi rms that diplomatic-political rhetoric 
signifi cantly contributes to poor bilateral relations 
between two states, which makes our fi rst hypothe-
sis completely correct.
Media rhetoric with its interpretations of sta-
tements made by political actors and publishing of 
“bombastic news”, as well as drawing of topics from 
the past signifi cantly aff ects the creation of negative 
views in the public of both sides on the open issues 
between the two states, which also completely con-
fi rms our second hypothesis.
4.  RESULTS
For the purpose of writing this paper, the aut-
hors analysed 59 publications of diplomatic rheto-
ric and 289 publications of media rhetoric. 
Th e diplomatic rhetoric publications were 
obtained from offi  cial sources of the Ministry of 
Foreign and European Aff airs of the Republic of 
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Croatia, Ministry of Foreign Aff airs of the Republic 
of Serbia and offi  cial announcements from the Eu-
ropean Commission. Publications related to media 
rhetoric were followed on Internet mass media of 
media houses in Croatia – Styria Media Group, 
EPH/HanzaMedia, Nacional News Corporation 
and Telegram Media Group; media houses in Ser-
bia – Adria Media Group, Ringier Axel Springer, 
Politika newspaper and magazines, and European 
publishers Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  Süd-
deutsche Zeitung Digitale Medien, Th e Indepen-
dent, BBC News, Guardian Europe, CNN/Europe 
and EU Observer.
Th e period of following all publications related 
to the subject and analysis lasted from June 2015 to 
January 2017.
Th e sampling of results is defi ned by the order 
of publications and interpretations (Figure 1).
Diplomatic publications from offi  cial sources 
are subject to diff erent media interpretations. Media 
interpretations are classifi ed on a scale of three mo-
des of reporting news, i.e. the offi  cial and unoffi  cial 
statements by political actors, offi  cial and unoffi  cial 
statements by representatives of the European Union 
and the European Commission and comments by 
journalists or editors. All publications were then cla-
ssifi ed in a tonal scale of favourability with their full 
content, i.e. superscript headline, headline, subhea-
ding, leads and the text itself.
Th e mode of rating the publications was de-
signed according to a tonal scale of favourability 
in proportions of -1, 0 and 1, where -1 defi nes a 
publication negatively inclined towards the oppo-
site side, 0 defi nes a neutral diplomatic publicati-
on and a neutral publication reported in a media 
interpretation, and 1 defi nes a positive inclination 




-1 0 1 total
Croatia 6 13 0 19
Serbia 9 22 0 31
EU 0 9 0 0
total 59




-1 0 1 total
Croatia 103 0 17 120
Serbia 117 0 20 137
EU 0 32 0 32
total    289
Table 2. Media rhetoric and text favourability tone by region. Source: authors’ work.
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Th e analysis of 59 publications of diplomatic 
rhetoric suggests that not even diplomatic publica-
tions were in a certain proportion of a neutral tone 
towards the opposite side. Th e Ministry of Foreign 
Aff airs of the Republic of Serbia published 31 di-
plomatic releases in total. Th ese publications were 
negatively connoted in 29% of the cases and ne-
utrally in 71%. Th e Croatian Ministry of Foreign 
and European Aff airs published 19 offi  cial releases 
in the same period, of which 31% were negatively 
connoted and 69% neutrally. Th e offi  cial releases 
from the European Commission were neutral in 
100% of the cases, and in total there were 9 offi  cial 
publications on the topic (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Analysis of the favourability scale tonality of the diplomatic rhetoric results.  Source: authors’ work.
   In media publications 289 articles were 
analysed which contained reports of news from 
diplomatic publications in media interpretations 
of news reports explained in the sampling of re-
sults (Figure 1). In the period in question the Ser-
bian media published 137 articles in total with in-
terpretations of diplomatic publications, of which 
85% were negatively connoted towards the oppo-
site side and 25% were positively connoted. In the 
analysed period Croatia published 120 articles, 
and in reports of the diplomatic news 85% of 
them were also reported with negative connotati-
ons and 25% with positive connotations regarding 
the opposite side. In both countries there were no 
neutrally connoted reports of diplomatic news. 
European media were always neutral in their pu-
blications and they reported news or interpreted 
them in their original tone. Th ey published 32 
news concerning the topic in question (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Analysis of the favourability scale tonality of the media rhetoric results. Source: authors’ work.
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5.  CONCLUSION
Th e position of the European Union that bila-
teral issues are not and can not be part of the acce-
ssion negotiations between 
Serbia and the EU is clear. Th e position of the 
European Commission is unique here, so all pre-
ss releases, statements given by the Commission’s 
offi  cials, as well as statements from member states 
offi  cials are in concordance with this position. Alt-
hough it has never been clearly defi ned which of 
the bilateral issues could overlap with the issues of 
certain chapters of accession negotiations, the Eu-
ropean Commission is unrelenting in its position.
Th e general position of Croatian policy is that 
Serbia must fulfi l all requirements set before it in 
the accession negotiations and adjust its legislation 
well to the European legislation. Th ereby Croatia 
insists that some of the open issues between the 
two states are contained in the accession negotiati-
on chapters. By setting conditions for opening cer-
tain chapters Croatia has faced negative reactions 
from the European Commission and turbulent re-
actions of the Serbian political elite and the Serbi-
an media space. Th is is also probably the only issue 
in Croatia with a national consensus of all political 
and media factors. 
By returning to the rhetoric from the 1990’s 
and emphasizing topics from the past, Serbia is 
trying to diminish Croatia’s position in its public 
and to prepare the public that it will have to fulfi l 
all requirements set before the country during the 
accession negotiations with the European Union. 
Th e political elite in Serbia is aware that the tou-
ghest challenges are yet to come, so it is trying to 
represent the Serbian government’s fi rm position 
towards Croatia and its “blockade” in the negotia-
tions with a sharper diplomatic-political and me-
dia rhetoric.  
Th e offi  cial Croatian policy supports Serbia on 
its European path and reserves the right to show 
its reservation in the accession negotiations regar-
ding the open issues between the two countries. 
Croatia also off ers its help and experience gained 
while it itself was in the process of accession ne-
gotiations.
Th e offi  cial Serbian policy expects that the Eu-
ropean Union does not allow Serbia to be “humi-
liated” and that certain states, especially Croatia, 
does not include open issues which can be dealt 
with bilaterally in the negotiations. In doing so, 
Serbia is of course aware that the negotiations are 
not going to be easy, but that it will act in good 
faith that all problems set before it can be resolved.
Th e positions of both states are based on a 
diff erent perception of open issues, where the pu-
blic is constantly presented with the idea that the 
disagreements are connected to historical events 
and that history is repeating itself. However, even 
though neither state shows signs that the offi  cial 
policy is heading towards a new war confl ict, to-
pics burdened with the past and daily accusations 
made through the media will not lead to an impro-
vement of relations and resolution of open issues 
any time soon.
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RAZLIKE U DIPLOMATSKOJ I MEDIJSKOJ RETORICI O HRVATSKOM 
UVJETOVANJU PRISTUPNIH PREGOVORA SRBIJE ZA ČLANSTVU EU 
Sažetak
Proces čvršćeg povezivanja zemalja Starog kontinenta u obliku Europske Unije širi se prema istoku. U tom je kontekstu i Srbija zapo-
čela svoje pretpristupne pregovore za članstvo. Hrvatski odnos prema tom procesu ima svoje specifi čnosti koje se temelje na negativ-
nom iskustvu zajedničkog življenja u bivšoj državi te svježih sjećanja na patnje i žrtve domovinskog rata. Iz tog je razloga za hrvatsku 
politiku ovaj process od iznimne važnosti. Srpske političke elite i medijski krugovi zagovaraju što brži pristup Europskoj Uniji dok s 
druge strane kod  znatnog dijela hrvatskih političara prevladava uvjerenje da kroz pretpristupne pregovore moraju riješiti sa Srbijom 
i neka bilateralna pitanja. Pitanja kao što su univerzalna jurisdikcija nad počinjenim ratnim zločinima na području bivše Jugoslavije, 
prava hrvatske nacionalne manjine na političku zastupljenost u institucijama Srbije kao i školovanje na hrvatskom jeziku i u skladu 
sa hrvatskim nacionalnim kurikulumom, neka su od najbitnijih. Bez sumnje je da Srbija za ulazak u Europsku Uniju mora ispuniti 
stroge kriterije pristupanja. Međutim, oštra retorika s obje strane i negativne reakcije na svaki prijedlog jedne ili druge strane ne do-
prinosi razvoju bilateralnih odnosa. Hrvatska je svojim prijedlozima mjerila za otvaranje pojedinih poglavlja naišla na neodobravanje 
čak i Europske komisije koja ima stav da se bilateralna pitanja ne uključuju u pregovore. Srpska politička elita optužuje Hrvatsku da 
pokušava zlorabiti process pregovora za ostvarivanje svojih ciljeva, a Hrvatska s druge strane inzistira na ispunjavanju svih obaveza 
postavljenih pred Srbiju. Rješenje ovih problema leži isključivo u dijalogu između Vlada Hrvatske i Srbije, al ii umjerenoj retorici 
cjelokupne javnosti i medija u obje zemlje. Cilj rada je ukazati kako razlike u izjavama iz diplomatsko-političkih krugova u odnosu 
na objave posljedično generirane kao medijske plasmane pojedinih medija mogu svojim varijetetima i različitim interpretacijama 
generirati nestabilnost u obje zemlje. Svrha ovog rada je istraživanje i analiza diplomatskih izjava i medijskih sadržaja o predmetnoj 
problematici za bolje razumijevanje bilateralnih odnosa dviju zemalja i precepcije njihovih građana – Hrvatske kao članice Europske 
Unije i Srbije kao kandidatkinje. Rezultati istraživanja ukazuju na postojanje konfl iktne situacije u pristupnim pregovorima te 
negativnog zaokreta u geopolitičkoj percepciji. To utječe na smanjenje vjerojatnosti rješavanja otvorenim pitanjima bilateralnim 
pregovorima. Vlade obje zemlje moraju povećati komunikacijske napore kako bi na osnovi racionalnije procjene cjelokupne situacije 
mogle donijeti pravovaljane odluke i o istima na adekvatan način obavještavati svoje ciljne javnosti.
Ključne riječi: hrvatsko-srpski odnosi, pristupni pregovori, geopolitička percepcija. 
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